

Programming language research meets new architectures

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Programming language theory

Programming languages as mathematical objects
(set of programs, source-level execution function).

- Clear setting to study program properties.
- Can compare to real implementations.
- Can prove properties of implementations.

Proof assistants: automated checking of large-scale human-written proofs
about maths or software.

Success stories: seL4, CompCert.

Today: programming language theory to define, design **specifications**.

Simple specifications

Formal proofs guarantee the absence of bugs... within the specification.

We need tools to **specify** properties clearly.

Example: “the compiler is correct”. What does that mean, precisely?

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Example: “the compiler is correct”. What does that mean, precisely?

```
char *decrypt_using_key(char *msg) {  
    char key[KEY_SIZE];  
    read_secret_key(key);  
    char *plaintext = decrypt(msg, key);  
    zero_out(key);  
    return plaintext;  
}
```

Full abstraction

A compiler $\text{comp}(-) : S \rightarrow T$ is **fully abstract** if

$$\forall p_1, p_2 \in S, \quad p_1 \simeq_S p_2 \iff \text{comp}(p_1) \simeq_T \text{comp}(p_2)$$

($p_1 \simeq_L p_2$: indistinguishable by a reference/idealized interpreter for L)

Very simple statement.

Very strong property!

Full abstraction: example

$$\forall p_1, p_2 \in S, \quad p_1 \simeq_S p_2 \iff \text{comp}(p_1) \simeq_T \text{comp}(p_2)$$

```
char *decrypt_using_secret_1(char *msg) {
    char key[KEY_SIZE]; read_secret_key(key);
    char *plaintext = decrypt(msg, key);
    zero_out(key);
    return plaintext;
}

char *decrypt_using_secret_2(char *msg) {
    char key[KEY_SIZE]; read_secret_key(key);
    char *plaintext = decrypt(msg, key);
    free(key);
    return plaintext;
}
```

Full abstraction: example

$$\forall p_1, p_2 \in S, \quad p_1 \simeq_S p_2 \iff \text{comp}(p_1) \simeq_T \text{comp}(p_2)$$

```
char *decrypt_using_secret_1(char *msg) {
    char key[KEY_SIZE]; read_secret_key(key);
    char *plaintext = decrypt(msg, key);
    zero_out(key);
    return plaintext;
}

char *decrypt_using_secret_2(char *msg) {
    char key[KEY_SIZE]; read_secret_key(key);
    char *plaintext = decrypt(msg, key);
    free(key);
    return plaintext;
}
```

Full abstraction \implies enforced privacy.

Full abstraction: consequences

$$\forall p_1, p_2 \in \mathcal{S}, \quad p_1 \simeq_S p_2 \iff \text{comp}(p_1) \simeq_T \text{comp}(p_2)$$

Example of properties preserved by a full-abstraction compiler:

- immutability guarantees
 \implies memory access protection
- privacy/encapsulation: data not reachable from the outside
 \implies enclaves
- preservation of control flow, even when calling user code/callbacks
 \implies control-flow integrity

Most compilers are **not** fully-abstract,
their target lacks runtime protection features.

Full abstraction: summary

Simple, interesting property to think about.

Especially for designers of instruction-set-level features!

Possible in some cases: Javascript

Fully-Abstract Compilation to Javascript,

Fournet, Swamy, Chen, Dagand, Strub, and Livshits [2013].

Zooming back

Programming Language Theory research brings formal tools
relevant to study low-level systems as well.

Specify properties of interest, prove them.

Thanks!

Cédric Fournet, Nikhil Swamy, Juan Chen, Pierre-Evariste Dagand, Pierre-Yves Strub, and Benjamin Livshits. Fully Abstract Compilation to JavaScript. 2013. URL <https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00780803>.

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